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Abstract
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
in response to the stock market collapse and economic downturn as well as the Bernard Madoff
scandal and other well-publicized frauds perpetrated against investors. Among its numerous provi-
sions, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to add a new section—
Section 21F—entitled “Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” The Dodd- Frank
Act also directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to establish an Office of the Whistle-
blower to administer the provisions of the new section. The Commission subsequently adopted
regulations that went into effect on August 12, 2011 to implement these provisions. This Arti-
cle will discuss one of the crucial mechanisms of the SEC’s whistleblower program: the award
program. Specifically, this Article will discuss the eligibility requirements for an award, the fac-
tors the Commission considers when determining an award amount, and the award review process.
This Article also highlights three matters a potential award applicant should consider before fil-
ing for an award: (1) an applicant will only be eligible if the information was provided to the
Commission after Dodd-Frank was enacted; (2) there must be a sufficient nexus between the tip
provided and the covered enforcement action for an applicant to be eligible for an award; and (3) a
whistleblower will generally not be eligible to receive an award if the whistleblower’s information
was submitted to the Commission after the Commission had requested the information, unless the
whistleblower had voluntarily provided the same information to another agency or self-regulatory
organization prior to the Commission’s request.
KEYWORDS: Dodd-Frank, Securities, Whistleblower
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ABSTRACT 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act in response to the stock market collapse 
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numerous provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act amended the Securities 
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“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” The Dodd-
Frank Act also directed the Securities and Exchange Commission to 
establish an Office of the Whistleblower to administer the provisions 
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whistleblower program: the award program. Specifically, this Article 
will discuss the eligibility requirements for an award, the factors the 
Commission considers when determining an award amount, and the 
award review process. This Article also highlights three matters a 
potential award applicant should consider before filing for an award: 
(1) an applicant will only be eligible if the information was provided 
to the Commission after Dodd-Frank was enacted; (2) there must be 
a sufficient nexus between the tip provided and the covered 
enforcement action for an applicant to be eligible for an award; and 
(3) a whistleblower will generally not be eligible to receive an award 
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if the whistleblower’s information was submitted to the Commission 
after the Commission had requested the information, unless the 
whistleblower had voluntarily provided the same information to 
another agency or self-regulatory organization prior to the 
Commission’s request. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2010, Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) in response to the 
stock market collapse and economic downturn as well as the Bernard 
Madoff scandal and other well-publicized frauds perpetrated against 
investors.1 Among its numerous provisions, the Dodd-Frank Act 
amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”) to 
add a new section—Section 21F—entitled “Securities Whistleblower 
Incentives and Protection.”2 The Dodd-Frank Act also directed the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC” or the “Commission”) 
to establish an Office of the Whistleblower (the “OWB”) to administer 
the provisions of the new section.3 The Commission subsequently 
adopted regulations that went into effect on August 12, 2011 (the “Final 
Rules”) to implement these provisions.4 
This Article will discuss one of the crucial mechanisms of the 
SEC’s whistleblower program: the award program.5 Part I will discuss 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform & Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 922(a), 124 Stat 1376, 1841 (2010). 
 2. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21F, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012). 
 3. Section 924(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to establish a 
separate office within the Commission to administer and enforce the provisions of 
Section 21F of the Exchange Act. Dodd-Frank Act § 924(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7. 
 4. Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-1 
(2015). 
 5. Both Section 21F and the Commission’s implementing rule expand anti-
retaliation protections for whistleblowers. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h); 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-
2(b). In addition to administering the whistleblower award program, the OWB’s 
activities include: 
 
 “Communicating with whistleblowers who have submitted tips” and other 
information to the agency. 
 “Staffing a publicly-available whistleblower hotline for members of the public 
to call with questions about the program.” 
 “Reviewing and entering whistleblower tips received by mail and fax into the 
Commission’s Tips, Complaints, and Referrals System (the “TCR System”).” 
 “Working with Enforcement staff to identify and track enforcement cases 
potentially involving a whistleblower to assist in the documentation of the 
whistleblower’s information and cooperation in anticipation of a potential 
claim for award.” 
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the statutory requirements to obtain a whistleblower award and the 
Commission’s procedures for receiving and considering claims.6 Part I 
will also discuss the factors that the Commission considers in 
determining the amount awarded to a successful claimant.7 Part II will 
then discuss three particular issues concerning the award process based 
on the Commission’s publicly-available releases to date: (1) an applicant 
will only be eligible if the information was provided to the Commission 
after the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted; (2) there must be a sufficient 
nexus between the tip provided and the covered enforcement action for 
an applicant to be eligible for an award; and (3) a whistleblower will 
generally not be eligible to receive an award if the whistleblower’s 
information was submitted to the Commission after the Commission had 
requested the information, unless the whistleblower had voluntarily 
provided the same information to another agency or self-regulatory 
organization prior to the Commission’s request.8 
I. OVERVIEW OF WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD PROCESS 
In order to understand the whistleblower award process, a 
whistleblower must first examine the requirements (including the 
                                                                                                                 
 “Maintaining and updating the OWB website to better inform the public about 
the whistleblower program . . . .” 
 “Identifying and monitoring whistleblower complaints alleging retaliation by 
employers or former employers for reporting possible securities law violations 
internally or to the Commission.” 
 “Providing training on the Dodd-Frank Act and the Commission’s 
implementing rules to Commission staff.” 
 “Providing guidance to Commission staff regarding the handling of 
confidential whistleblower-identifying information and the handling of 
potentially privileged information provided by whistleblowers.” 
 “Coordinating with Commission staff in making external referrals to other 
government agencies consistent with the Dodd-Frank Act’s and the Final 
Rules’ confidentiality provisions.” 
 “Actively publicizing the program through participation in webinars, media 
interviews, presentations, press releases, and other public communications.” 
 
SEC, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE DODD-FRANK WHISTLEBLOWER 
PROGRAM 5-7 (2013). 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. See infra Part I.B. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
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various exceptions to these requirements) and legal definitions set out in 
the Dodd-Frank Act and the Final Rules. We begin with the statutory 
authorization for the SEC to pay whistleblower awards. Section 21F 
authorizes the SEC to pay awards to eligible individuals “who 
voluntarily provide[] original information to the Commission that 
le[ads] to the successful enforcement” of actions brought by 
Commission, and even, in certain circumstances, other agencies, and 
which result in monetary sanctions of more than $1 million.9 Section 
21F(b)(1) directs that, if the SEC determines that one or more 
whistleblowers are eligible to receive an award and not otherwise 
disqualified from receiving an award,10 the whistleblowers will be paid, 
in the aggregate, between 10% to 30% of the “monetary sanctions” 
collected in the enforcement action.11 
Section 21F further states that the determination of the amount of 
an award is “in the discretion of the Commission.”12 In exercising this 
discretion, Congress mandated that the Commission take into account 
three considerations when deciding on an appropriate award percentage: 
(1) “the significance of the information provided by the whistleblower to 
the success of the” enforcement action; (2) “the degree of assistance 
provided by the whistleblower” in the enforcement action; and (3) the 
“programmatic interest of the Commission in deterring violations of the 
                                                                                                                 
 9. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1); see also id. § 78u-6(a)(1) (defining a “covered judicial 
and administrative action”). The Dodd-Frank Act also established a fund that allows the 
Commission to pay awards to qualifying whistleblowers and to fund activities of the 
SEC’s Inspector General. Id. § 78u-6(g)(1)-(2). 
 10. Id. § 78u-6(b), (c)(2). However, if an otherwise eligible whistleblower falls 
within a number of specific categories delineated in the statute, then the whistleblower 
will be barred from receiving an award. These categories include: whistleblowers who 
obtained their original information while employed by certain regulatory or law 
enforcement agencies or entities, such as the Department of Justice or a self-regulatory 
organization, whistleblowers who were convicted of a criminal violation related to the 
enforcement action for which they are seeking an award, whistleblowers who obtained 
their original information while engaged in performing an audit of financial statements 
mandated under the federal securities laws, where the whistleblower’s submission 
would be contrary to the requirements of Section 10A of the Exchange Act, and 
whistleblowers who fail to submit information to the Commission in such form as the 
Commission requires. Id. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D). 
 11. Id. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
 12. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A). 
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securities laws by making awards to whistleblowers who provide 
information that leads to the successful enforcement of such laws.”13 
Since the program’s inception, the Commission has paid awards to 
more than a dozen whistleblowers.14 The largest payment to date was an 
award that was expected to yield between $30 million and $35 million.15 
A. WHISTLEBLOWER AWARD ELIGIBILITY 
The Dodd-Frank Act defines a whistleblower as “any individual 
who provides, or 2 or more individuals acting jointly who provide, 
information relating to a violation relating to a violation of the securities 
laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, 
by the Commission.”16 The Final Rules provide that this information 
encompasses a “possible violation . . . that has occurred, is ongoing, or 
is about to occur.”17 The Final Rules also provide that a whistleblower 
must be an individual and that “[a] company or another entity is not 
eligible to be a whistleblower.”18 Furthermore, whistleblower status is 
                                                                                                                 
 13. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B). The statute also grants the Commission discretion to 
consider “such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by rule or 
regulation.” Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV). 
 14. Final Orders of the Commission, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/o 
wb-final-orders.shtml [http://perma.cc/F233-55GZ] (listing the final disposition of 
applications for awards received by the OWB). 
 15. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 
73174, 2014 WL 4678597, at *1 (Sept. 22, 2014). 
 16. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(6). 
 17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1) (2015). Section 21F(a)(6) defines a whistleblower 
as an individual, or individuals acting jointly, who provide “information relating to a 
violation of the securities laws to the Commission, in a manner established, by rule or 
regulation, by the Commission.” In its adopting release implementing the whistleblower 
rule, the Commission explained that the reference in the rule to a “possible violation . . . 
that has occurred, is ongoing, or is about to occur” was intended to “provide[] greater 
clarity concerning when an individual who provides [the Commission] with information 
about possible violations, including possible future violations, of the securities laws 
qualifies as a whistleblower” and that “[a]n individual would meet the definition of 
whistleblower if he or she provides information about a ‘possible violation’ that ‘is 
about to occur.’” Implementation of the Whistleblower Provisions of Section 21F of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 64545, 2011 WL 
2045838, at *6 (May 25, 2011) [hereinafter Adopting Release]. 
 18. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1). This requirement conforms with the statutory 
language defining a “whistleblower” as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more 
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contingent on an applicant “provid[ing] the Commission with 
information pursuant to the procedures set forth in [Rule] 21F-9(a).”19 
Even if an applicant meets the definitional whistleblower requirements, 
he or she can only become eligible for an award if the information is 
submitted “in accordance with the procedures and conditions described 
in §§ 240.21F-4, 240.21F-8, and 240.21F-9 of [Rule 21F].”20 
If an individual satisfies the definition of a “whistleblower,” the 
next inquiry is whether the whistleblower has satisfied the rest of the 
criteria for award eligibility. Rule 21F-3 lists four requirements that a 
whistleblower must satisfy in order to qualify for an award:21 
 
 The whistleblower must have provided information 
“voluntarily” to the Commission;22 
 the information provided to the SEC must qualify as 
“original information;23 
                                                                                                                 
individuals acting jointly who provide” the specified information. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
6(a)(6). 
 19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1). The Final Rules provide two avenues to submit 
original information to the Commission: online at www.sec.gov or by mailing or faxing 
a Form TCR to the Office of the Whistleblower. Id. § 240.21F-9(a)(1)-(2). In order to 
be eligible for an award, a potential whistleblower must also declare that his 
information is “true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief.” Id. § 
240.21F-9(b). The Final Rules also provide instructions for potential whistleblowers 
who wish to provide their information anonymously through an attorney. See id. § 
240.21F-9(c). The Final Rules also provide an eligibility window for potential 
whistleblowers who provided original information in writing after the enactment of 
Dodd-Frank (July 21, 2010) but before the effective date of the rules. See id. § 240.21F-
9(d); see also infra Part II.A (discussing Dodd-Frank’s enactment date as the earliest 
point when information submitted to the Commission is considered “original”). 
 20. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(2). 
 21. Id. § 240.21F-3(a). The four criteria in Rule 21F-3(a) correspond to the four 
criteria specified in the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(1) (defining a 
“covered judicial or administrative action” as one brought by the Commission that 
results in monetary sanctions exceeding $1 million); id. § 78u-6(b)(1) (authorizing 
awards to be paid to whistleblowers “who voluntarily provided original information to 
the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the covered judicial or 
administrative action, or related action”). 
 22. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-3(a)(1). 
 23. Id. § 240.21F-3(a)(2). 
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 the information must have “le[d] to the successful 
enforcement by the Commission of a federal court or 
administrative action;24 and 
 in its successful enforcement action, the Commission must 
have obtained monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 
million.25 
 
In addition to these four substantive requirements, the 
whistleblower must comply with the procedural requirements and avoid 
subjection to the eligibility prohibitions in Rules 21F-8 and 21F-9.26 
1. Voluntariness 
Voluntariness is satisfied when a whistleblower submits 
information to the Commission “before a request, inquiry, or demand 
that relates to the subject matter of [the] submission is directed to [the 
whistleblower] or anyone representing [the whistleblower]” by either the 
Commission, in connection with an investigation, inspection, or 
examination by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (the 
“PCAOB”), or any self-regulatory agency, or in connection with an 
investigation by Congress, another federal authority, or a state Attorney 
General or securities regulatory authority.27 Voluntariness will not be 
satisfied if the whistleblower is required to submit information to the 
Commission due to a preexisting legal duty, a contractual duty owed to 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Id. § 240.21F-3(a)(3). 
 25. Id. § 240.21F-3(a)(4). 
 26. Id. § 240.21F-3(a). The Commission is also authorized to pay awards in certain 
“related actions.” A “related action” is defined as a “judicial or administrative action 
brought by: (i) the Attorney General of the United States; (ii) an appropriate regulatory 
authority; (iii) a self-regulatory organization; or (iv) A state attorney general in a 
criminal case.” Id. § 240.21F-3(b)(1). An award will be granted in a related action when 
one of the above agencies or entities brings its own successful enforcement action based 
on “the same original information that the whistleblower gave to the Commission” 
leading to the Commission obtaining monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million, 
and that this original information “led to the successful enforcement of the related 
action under the same criteria described in these rules for awards made in connection 
with Commission actions.” Id. § 240.21F-3(b)(2). 
 27. Id. § 240.21F-4(a)(1). 
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the Commission or the other authorities cited above, or as a result of a 
duty mandated by a judicial or administrative order.28 
2. Original Information 
The information provided must also be original, as defined by the 
following criteria: 
(i) Derived from [the whistleblower’s] independent knowledge or 
independent analysis; 
(ii) Not already known to the Commission from any other source, 
unless [the whistleblower is] the original source of the information; 
(iii) Not exclusively derived from an allegation made in a judicial or 
administrative hearing, in a governmental report, hearing, audit, or 
investigation, or from the news media, unless [the whistleblower is] 
a source of the information; and 
(iv) Provided to the Commission for the first time after July 21, 
2010.29 
Independent knowledge consists of any “factual information in [the 
whistleblower’s] possession that is not derived from publically available 
sources,”30 while independent analysis may be the whistleblower’s “own 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. § 240.21F-4(a)(3). 
 29. Id. § 240.21F-4(b). The only substantive change of this definition from how it 
appears in the Dodd-Frank Act is the July 21, 2010 cut-off for providing information to 
the Commission for the first time. See id. § 240.21F(a)(3). In a recent Second Circuit 
decision, the Court rejected a challenge to the July 21, 2010 cut-off date, finding that 
the SEC’s interpretation was consistent with Section 21F and reasonable. See Stryker v. 
SEC, 780 F.3d 163, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2015); see also infra Part III.A. 
 30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(2). The Adopting Release states that “independent 
knowledge must be “derived from a whistleblower’s own experiences, observations, or 
communications, and not from information that is available to the general public; 
however, the Release makes clear that this knowledge does not have to be direct, first-
hand knowledge, since “[s]uch an approach could prevent the Commission from 
receiving valuable information about possible violations from whistleblowers who are 
not themselves involved in the conduct at issue, but who learn about it through their 
observations, relationships, or personal diligence.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at 
*22. 
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analysis, whether done alone or in combination with others . . . which 
reveals information that is not generally known to the public.” In 
contrast to “independent knowledge,” “independent analysis” can be 
derived from publically available information, provided that it “reveals 
information that is not generally known or available to the public.”31 
Information will not generally be deemed to have been derived 
from the whistleblower’s “independent knowledge” or “independent 
analysis,” and thus will not qualify as “original information” if it was 
obtained in certain specified circumstances.32 The Commission 
explained its rationale for excluding this information by noting: 
[t]he exclusions generally apply to narrow categories of individuals 
whose knowledge does not, in our view, constitute “independent 
knowledge or analysis of a whistleblower,” because the information 
or analysis was acquired by an individual: (1) On behalf of a third 
party operating in a sensitive legal, compliance, or governance role . 
. . ; or (2) in the performance of an engagement required by the 
federal securities laws . . . ; or (3) by illegal means.33 
The Commission further stated that it believed “there are good 
policy reasons to exclude information from consideration as 
‘independent knowledge’ or ‘independent analysis’ in the hands of 
certain persons, and in certain circumstances, where its use in a 
whistleblower submission might undermine the proper operation of 
internal compliance systems.”34 The Commission emphasized, however, 
that it did not “serve[] the purposes of Section 21F to apply this 
principle in a manner that creates expansive new exclusions for broad 
categories of company personnel (e.g., any supervisor, or any employee 
involved in control functions or in processes related to required CEO 
and CFO certifications)” and that its approach here “is to adopt more 
tailored exclusions for ‘core’ persons and processes related to internal 
compliance mechanisms, and to enhance the incentives for employees to 
                                                                                                                 
 31. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(3). “[T]his definition was intended to recognize that 
there are circumstances where individuals can review publicly available information, 
and, through their additional evaluation and analysis, provide vital assistance to the 
Commission staff in understanding complex schemes and identifying securities 
violations.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *22. 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4). 
 33. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *24. 
 34. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *31.  
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report wrongdoing through their company’s established internal 
procedures.”35 
The first of these exclusions is for information that was obtained 
through a communication that was subject to the attorney-client 
privilege, unless disclosure would be permitted by an attorney pursuant 
to Part 205.3 of the Commission’s attorney conduct rules, or was 
obtained “in connection with the legal representation of a client on 
whose behalf [the whistleblower or his] employer or firm are providing 
services, and [the whistleblower seeks] to use the information to make a 
whistleblower submission for [his] own benefit.”36 In creating this 
exclusion, the Commission stated that it “believe[d] this result is 
consistent with the purpose of promoting effective enforcement of the 
securities laws . . . [since] [c]onsultation with attorneys can improve 
compliance on the part of entities and individuals.”37 
There are several additional exclusions under the Final Rules for 
information obtained by company officials and third parties who assist 
companies in investigations of possible violations of the law. These 
exclusions are designed, according to the Commission, to ensure that the 
persons most responsible for an entity’s conduct and compliance with 
law “are not incentivized to promote their own self-interest at the 
possible expense of the entity’s ability to detect, address, and self-report 
violations.”38 Specifically, these exclusions apply to information 
obtained during the course of a company’s internal compliance or audit 
activities in the following circumstances: 
 
 information obtained from an officer, director, trustee, or 
partner of an entity who learned of it because another 
person informed that individual of allegations of 
misconduct or “in connection with the entity’s processes for 
identifying, reporting, and addressing possible violations of 
law;”39 
                                                                                                                 
 35. Id. 
 36. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)-(ii). 
 37. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *24. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A). 
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 information from an employee whose principal duties 
involve compliance or internal audit responsibilities, or 
who was employed by or otherwise associated with a firm 
retained to perform compliance or internal audit functions 
for an entity;40 
 information from an employee or person associated with a 
firm retained to conduct an inquiry or investigation into 
possible violations of law;41 
 an employee or someone associated with a public 
accounting firm if the information was obtained through a 
required accountant’s engagements under federal securities 
law;42 and 
 information obtained from a person already subject to one 
of the exclusions, unless the information is “not excluded 
from that person’s use pursuant to [these exclusions], or 
[the submitter is] providing the Commission with 
information about possible violations involving that 
person.”43 
 
Finally, the Final Rules exclude information obtained in a manner 
that is determined by a court to violate federal or state criminal law.44 
The Commission explained that the purpose of this exclusion is to 
ensure “that the whistleblower award program not be used to encourage 
or reward individuals for obtaining information in violation of federal or 
state criminal law—even if the information might otherwise assist our 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(B). 
 41. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(C). 
 42. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(D). 
 43. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(vi). The Commission explained that this exclusion is 
intended to “work in tandem with the other exclusions set forth in Rule 21F-4(b)(4) to 
preclude submissions in a limited set of circumstances,” such as, for example, “if an 
employee only learns about possible violations because he or she is interviewed in the 
course of a company internal investigation, Rule 21F-4(b)(4)(vi) will not permit that 
employee to file a whistleblower submission claiming the information as his or her 
‘independent knowledge’ or ‘independent analysis.’” Adopting Release, supra note 17, 
at *38. Another example cited by the Commission is where “a senior company officer, 
after receiving a report concerning possible securities violations, gives the information 
to his or her assistant.” Id. In such a case, the assistant “will not be able to seek an 
award based on the information as long as the officer is barred from doing so.” Id. 
 44. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iv). 
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enforcement of the federal securities laws.”45 It should be noted, 
however, that this exclusion does not apply to information obtained in a 
manner that violates domestic civil or foreign law (civil or criminal), or 
judicial or administrative protective orders.46 
The Final Rules also contain several exceptions that may permit 
individuals subject to the exclusions to qualify as having provided 
“original information” in certain limited circumstances. As noted, 
information obtained in the course of a legal representation is generally 
excluded from the definition of “independent knowledge” and 
“independent analysis.”47 There is an exception to this exclusion in cases 
where “disclosure of that information would otherwise be permitted by 
an attorney” under certain attorney conduct rules.48 Similarly, 
                                                                                                                 
 45. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *36. 
 46. Id. In deciding that the exclusion should not apply to information obtained in 
violation of foreign law, the Commission noted that since other countries’ laws often 
greatly vary from United States law, it concluded that it was “not in a position to decide 
as a categorical rule when it is appropriate to deny an award based on foreign law,” 
recognizing that whistleblowers in foreign jurisdictions “may have obligations to 
comply with applicable foreign laws,” such as, in some jurisdictions, “criminal 
penalties for unlawfully obtaining certain information or for unlawfully disclosing 
certain information to authorities outside their borders.” Id. at *36, *36 n.181. With 
regard to information obtained in violation of domestic civil law, the Commission 
concluded that the exclusion should not apply since it would be “difficult to apply 
consistently given the patchwork of state and municipal civil laws that might be 
implicated.” Id. at *36. Finally, the Commission explained that it decided not to include 
information obtained in violation of protective orders —which, the Commission noted, 
are “frequently negotiated between parties to private litigation and are generally 
intended to protect proprietary information against public disclosure or improper 
use”—since “[i]t would be against public policy for litigants to obtain a protective 
order, or to seek enforcement of such an order, for the purpose of preventing the 
disclosure of information regarding violations of law to a law enforcement agency. Id. 
at *37. 
 47. See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text. 
 48. Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i) and (ii) set out the attorney/legal representation 
exclusions, and also set out exceptions to the exclusions. Thus, Rules 21F-4(b)(4)(i) and 
(ii) separately provide that the exclusion for information obtained through a 
communication that was subject to the attorney-client privilege in connection with the 
legal representation of a client on whose behalf the whistleblower or his employer or 
firm are providing services will not apply if the “disclosure of that information would 
otherwise be permitted by an attorney pursuant to [Part 205 of the Commission’s 
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information obtained as a result of the whistleblower’s status at the 
company or involvement in a company investigation or audit may also 
be excluded from being considered “original information.”49 
Nevertheless, this otherwise excluded information may, in certain 
circumstances, fall within the scope of specified exceptions to the 
exclusion. Specifically, the rules provide for an exception to the 
exclusion if the whistleblower has a reasonable basis to believe that: (1) 
disclosure of the information “is necessary to prevent the relevant entity 
from engaging in conduct that is likely to cause substantial injury to the 
financial interest or property of the entity or investors;”50 or (2) the 
entity is “engaging in conduct that will impede an investigation of the 
misconduct.”51 Another exception occurs when “[a]t least 120 days have 
                                                                                                                 
attorney conduct rules], the applicable state attorney conduct rules, or otherwise.” 17 
C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(i)-(ii). 
 49. Specifically, these exclusions cover the situations where: 
 
  (1) a company’s senior official is informed by another person of allegations of 
misconduct, or obtains the information in connection with the company’s processes for 
identifying, reporting, and addressing violations of law; 
  (2) an employee whose principal duties involve compliance or internal audit 
responsibilities, or who was employed by or otherwise associated with a firm retained 
to perform compliance or internal audit functions for an entity obtains the information 
as a result of serving in these capacities; 
  (3) a person obtains the information as a result of being employed by or 
otherwise associated with a firm retained to conduct an inquiry or investigation into 
possible violations of law; or 
  (4) a person obtains the information as a result of being employed by or 
otherwise associated with a public accounting firm in connection with “the performance 
of an engagement required of an independent public accountant under the federal 
securities laws (other than an audit subject to §240.21F-8(c)(4) of this chapter).” 
 
17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(iii)(A)-(D). 
 50. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(A). The Commission explained that “[i]n such cases, 
we believe it is in the public interest to accept whistleblower submissions and to reward 
whistleblowers—whether they are officers, directors, auditors, or similar responsible 
personnel—who give us information that allows us to take enforcement action to 
prevent substantial injury to the entity or to investors.” Adopting Release, supra note 
17, at *33. 
 51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(B). This exception is designed to cover 
situations where the whistleblower has a reasonable belief that the entity is acting in 
“bad faith,” by, for example, “destroying documents, improperly influencing witnesses, 
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elapsed since [the whistleblower] provided the information to the 
relevant entity’s audit committee, chief legal officer, chief compliance 
officer . . . or [the whistleblower’s] supervisor” unless they were 
“already aware of the information.”52 
The Final Rules also provide guidance as to whether a 
whistleblower can be considered an original source of information to the 
Commission if another party previously provided the same information 
to the Commission. The general rule states that the Commission will 
consider the whistleblower to be the original source of the information if 
(1) the information satisfies the definition of original information and 
(2) the other source—which can include, as the Adopting Release 
clarifies, the whistleblower’s employer53—obtained the information 
from the whistleblower or his representative.54 Additionally, if the 
                                                                                                                 
or engaging in other improper conduct that may hinder our investigation.” Adopting 
Release, supra note 17, at *34. 
 52. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(v)(C). The purpose of this exception is to allow 
potential whistleblowers to know “that they will have a date certain after which they 
will no longer be ineligible to make a submission based upon the information in their 
possession [and] is not intended to suggest to entities that they have a 120-day ‘grace 
period’ for determining their response to the violations.” Adopting Release, supra note 
17, at *34. This exception to the exclusion was invoked by the Commission in a recent 
award to a company officer on the grounds that the whistleblower “reported the 
information to other responsible persons at the entity, as provided for under our rules, 
or such persons knew about it, at least 120 days before [the whistleblower] reported the 
information to the Commission.” Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, 
Exchange Act Release No. 74404, 2015 WL 860712, at *1 n.1 (Mar. 2, 2015). 
 53. The Adopting Release explains that an individual would be deemed the original 
source of information provided to the Commission by her employer if the individual 
had reported the information in the first instance through the “employer’s internal 
whistleblower, legal, or compliance procedures for reporting allegations of possible 
violations of law, [and] the company later self-reports the individual’s information to 
the Commission, and the individual thereafter files a whistleblower submission.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *39. 
 54. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5); see also Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *19 
(noting that “under Rules 21F-4(b)(5) and (6) an individual can be considered the 
original source of information provided to the Commission by another source 
(including the individual’s employer)” (emphasis added)). The Adopting Release 
provides an example to illustrate the applicability of the rule: 
[I]f B makes a whistleblower submission based upon information 
obtained from A, and A later makes his or her own submission of 
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Commission received the information from Congress, federal 
authorities, a state Attorney General or securities authority, self-
regulatory organizations, or the PCAOB, a whistleblower can still be 
considered its original source if he voluntarily submitted the information 
and established his status as the original source of the information given 
by the other agency.55 
If a whistleblower provides information to one of the designated 
agencies, entities, or through a company’s internal compliance 
procedures for reporting allegations of possible violations of law, and 
the whistleblower then submits the same information to the Commission 
within 120 days of providing it to the agency, entity, or through a 
company’s internal compliance procedures, then the Commission will 
consider that the whistleblower provided the information as of the date 
the whistleblower had provided it to the agency, entity, or company in 
evaluating any later claim for an award submitted by the 
whistleblower.56 This provision is designed for the benefit of 
                                                                                                                 
that information, then A will be considered the “original source” of 
the information (assuming that A establishes his or her status as the 
original source and that the information otherwise qualifies as 
“original information”). 
Id. at *39. The Adopting Release clarifies, however, that A’s status as the “original 
source” of the information would not exclude B from award eligibility in this example 
because B had obtained the facts underlying his or her submission from A, and those 
facts were not derived from publicly available sources, and, thus, B would also be 
deemed to have submitted information derived from his or her “independent 
knowledge.” Id. As the Adopting Release explained “both submissions could qualify as 
‘original information;’ B’s because he or she was first to bring the Commission 
information derived from ‘independent knowledge,’ and A’s because he or she was the 
‘original source’ of information that, as of B’s submission, was already known to the 
Commission.” Id. 
 55. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(5). 
 56. Id. § 240.21F-4(b)(7). The Commission had originally proposed a 90-day 
period for a whistleblower to submit the information to the Commission in order to 
obtain this “lookback” treatment. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *40-41. In 
extending this to 120 days, the Commission explained that it felt that the additional 30 
days provided a better balancing of the Commission’s “primary goal” to “encourage the 
submission of high-quality information to facilitate the effectiveness and efficiency of 
the Commission’s enforcement program,” which militated against the proposals some 
commentators made for a lookback period of 180 days or longer, as against the 
Commission’s goal of encouraging companies to establish “effective programs for 
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whistleblowers by providing them with a reasonable period of time to 
make their reporting decisions.57 
If the Commission already possesses some information about the 
matter that the whistleblower provided information for, and the 
whistleblower is thus not the original source of the information, a 
whistleblower can still be considered an original source for “any 
information [provided] that is derived from [the whistleblower’s] 
independent knowledge or analysis and that materially adds to the 
information that the Commission already possesses.”58 
3. Leads to a Successful Enforcement Action 
Information is deemed to have led to successful enforcement action 
in three circumstances. First, when a whistleblower provided 
information that led Commission staff: 
to commence an examination, open an investigation, reopen an 
investigation that the Commission had closed, or to inquire 
concerning different conduct as part of a current examination or 
investigation, and the Commission brought a successful judicial or 
administrative action based in whole or in part on conduct that was 
the subject of [the whistleblower’s] original information.59 
Second, when a whistleblower gave information that “significantly 
contributed” to the success of an action already under examination or 
investigation “by the Commission, the Congress, any other authority of 
the federal government, a state Attorney General or other securities 
                                                                                                                 
identifying, correcting, and self-reporting unlawful conduct by company officers or 
employees” and to “support . . . the effective functioning of company compliance and 
related systems by allowing employees to take their concerns about possible violations 
to appropriate company officials first while still preserving their rights under the 
Commission’s whistleblower program,” which all militated against a too-short 
lookback period. Id. at *41. The Commission stated that it “believe[d] that the balance 
struck in the final rule will promote the continued development and maintenance of 
robust compliance programs.” Id. 
 57. Id. at *42. 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(b)(6). 
 59. Id. § 240.21F-4(c)(1). 
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regulatory authority, any self-regulatory authority, or the PCAOB.”60 
Third, when a whistleblower gave information through an “entity’s 
internal whistleblower, legal or compliance procedures” for reporting 
securities violations “before or at the same time [the whistleblower] 
reported them to the Commission,” and then “the entity later provided 
[the] information to the Commission, or provided results of an audit or 
investigation initiated in whole or in part in response to information [the 
whistleblower] reported to the entity,” provided that the information 
satisfies either of the prior two criteria.61 
4. Application for Award 
If a claimant has so far met the requirements to be considered for 
an award, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether he or she 
followed the proper procedures for making a claim for award.62 
B. DETERMINATION OF AWARD AMOUNT 
1. Overview 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, if the SEC determines that one or more 
whistleblowers are entitled to receive an award for the assistance they 
provided in a particular covered action, or a related action, then they 
shall receive, in the aggregate, between 10% to 30% of “what has been 
collected of the monetary sanctions imposed in the action or related 
                                                                                                                 
 60. Id. § 240.21F-4(c)(2). In determining what constitutes “significantly 
contributing” to the success of an enforcement action, the Commission stated that it will 
“look at factors such as whether the information allowed us to bring: (1) Our successful 
action in significantly less time or with significantly fewer resources; (2) additional 
successful claims; or (3) successful claims against additional individuals or entities.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *46. 
 61. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(3). This latter provision was added by the 
Commission “to create a significant financial incentive for whistleblowers to report 
possible violations to internal compliance programs before, or at the same time, they 
report to us.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *46. 
 62. See infra Part I.C.4. (discussing procedures for making an award claim). If a 
claimant has failed to meet any of the required procedures for making a claim set forth 
above, he may still be considered for an award upon a showing of “extraordinary 
circumstances.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(a). A determination of extraordinary 
circumstances rests within the sole discretion of the Commission. Id. 
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actions.”63 The Dodd-Frank Act placed the actual award percentage 
determination within the SEC’s discretion, directing that the SEC 
consider the significance of the whistleblower’s information to the 
success of the enforcement action, the extent of the assistance provided 
by the whistleblower, the SEC’s “programmatic interest” in deterring 
the securities law violations involved in the covered action, and other 
factors established under the Commission’s rules.64 The Dodd-Frank Act 
further bars a disappointed whistleblower from appealing the SEC’s 
determination of an award amount to the United States Court of 
Appeals.65 
As noted, the Dodd-Frank Act provides that the determination of 
the amount of an award is “in the discretion of the Commission.”66 In 
explaining the parameters to be used by the Commission in exercising 
its discretion, the Adopting Release notes that “[s]ince every 
enforcement matter is unique, the analytical framework adopted by the 
Commission in [Rule 21F-6] provides general principles without 
mandating a particular result” and that “no attempt has been made to list 
the factors in order of importance, weigh the relative importance of each 
factor, or suggest how much any factor should increase or decrease the 
award percentage.”67 Rather, the Adopting Release concludes that “[i]n 
                                                                                                                 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). Rule 21F-5(c) further provides that 
“[i]f the Commission makes awards to more than one whistleblower in connection with 
the same action or related action, the Commission will determine an individual 
percentage award for each whistleblower, but in no event will the total amount awarded 
to all whistleblowers in the aggregate be less than 10 percent or greater than 30 percent 
of the amount the Commission or the other authorities collect.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-
5(c). The Adopting Release provides an example to illustrate the point: “Thus, for 
example, one whistleblower could receive an award of 25 percent of the collected 
sanctions, and another could receive an award of 5 percent, but they could not each 
receive an award of 30 percent.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *53. 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1). 
 65. See id. § 78u-6(f). Subsection (f) provides that “[a]ny such determination, 
except the determination of the amount of an award if the award was made in 
accordance with subsection (b), may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals of 
the United States not more than 30 days after the determination is issued by the 
Commission.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 66. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A). 
 67. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *56; see also Order Determining 
Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 73174, 2014 WL 4678597, at 
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the end, [the SEC] anticipates that the determination of the appropriate 
percentage of a whistleblower award will involve a highly 
individualized review of the facts and circumstances surrounding each 
award using the analytical framework set forth in the final rule.”68 In 
addition, the Adopting Release notes, “the absence of any one of the 
positive factors does not mean that the award percentage will be lower 
than 30 percent, nor does the absence of negative factors mean the 
award percentage will be higher than 10 percent.”69 To illustrate this 
principle, the Adopting Release offers the example of a whistleblower 
who could receive a maximum award even though the whistleblower did 
not satisfy certain positive factors, “such as participating in internal 
compliance programs,” so long as the whistleblower satisfied other 
positive factors, such as “provid[ing] the Commission with significant 
information about a possible securities violation and provid[ing] 
substantial assistance in the Commission action or related action.”70 
The Dodd-Frank Act directs that the award payment be based on 
the amount the SEC or other agency actually collects from the 
defendants or respondents, not on the amount that the defendants or 
respondents are ordered to pay in the covered action or related action.71 
Thus, if the sanctions ordered in the covered action amount to $100 
million, but the SEC is only able to collect $100,000 from the 
defendants, then the amount of any whistleblower award paid by the 
Commission in that action will be calculated by multiplying the award 
percentage decided upon by the $100,000 of the collected sanctions. If 
the Commission collects additional monetary sanctions after an initial 
award has been paid, the whistleblower will receive additional award 
payments based on these later collections.72 
                                                                                                                 
*1 n.4 (Sept. 22, 2014) (noting that “every enforcement action is unique and thus each 
award determination involves a highly individualized review of the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the particular case”). 
 68. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *56. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
 72. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Announces Additional $150,000 Payment 
to Recipient of First Whistleblower Award (Apr. 4, 2014) (noting that the 
Commission’s first award recipient under the program received additional payments of 
approximately $150,000 since the award was announced on August 21, 2012). 
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To date, the SEC has awarded eighteen whistleblowers since the 
whistleblower program began nearly four years ago.73 Payouts have 
totaled more than $50 million out of an investor protection fund 
established by Congress.74 The SEC has also issued at least four 
maximum 30% awards.75 
                                                                                                                 
 73. See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 74. Press Release, SEC, SEC Pays More Than $3 Million to Whistleblower (July 
17, 2015). The investor protection fund was established pursuant to Section 21F(g) of 
the Dodd-Frank Act to fund the payment of awards to whistleblowers under the 
whistleblower award program. The fund is financed entirely through monetary 
sanctions paid to the SEC by securities law violators, and no money is taken or 
withheld from harmed investors to pay whistleblower awards. Id. Four of these 
whistleblowers received awards for their assistance in both the SEC enforcement 
actions and related actions by other agencies. See Order Determining Whistleblower 
Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 69749, 106 S.E.C. Docket 2324, 2013 WL 
2607652 (June 12, 2013) (approving three whistleblower award claims); Order 
Determining Related Action Whistleblower Award Claims, Exchange Act Release No. 
70293, 107 S.E.C. Docket 351, 2013 WL 4647206 (Aug. 30, 2013) (approving three 
whistleblower award claims in related actions); Order Determining Whistleblower 
Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 73174, 2014 WL 4678597 (Sept. 22, 2014) 
(awarding a whistleblower award claim). 
 75. See Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release 
No. 72652, 109 S.E.C. Docket 2170, 2014 WL 3588057, at *1 (July 22, 2014); Order 
Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act. Release No. 72301, 109 
S.E.C. Docket 67, 2014 WL 2466464, at *1 (June 3, 2014); Order Determining 
Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 70775, 107 S.E.C. Docket 
2912, 2013 WL 5819624, *1 (Oct. 30, 2013); Order Determining Whistleblower Award 
Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 67698, 104 S.E.C. Docket 1620, 2012 WL 3578897 
(Aug. 21, 2012). It should be noted that the Commission has, on occasion, redacted the 
award percentage and disclosed only the amount of the expected award payment. See, 
e.g., Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 
73174, 2014 WL 4678597, at *1 (Sept. 22, 2014) (noting that in light of the redacted 
award percentage and the amount of sanctions collected as of the date of the order, the 
whistleblower would be receiving a payment of between $30 and $35 million). 
  The SEC’s orders authorizing award payments generally have not detailed the 
particular information and assistance provided by the successful whistleblowers or the 
weight given by the agency to the various positive factors in evaluating the 
whistleblowers’ contributions to the success of the enforcement actions. Indeed, as 
noted, the publicly-issued orders redact the names of the whistleblowers and, in many 
cases, other significant information such as the names of the parties prosecuted by the 
SEC. See, e.g., Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act. 
Release No. 72947, 109 S.E.C. Docket 3790, 2014 WL 4258232, at *1 (Aug. 29, 2014). 
 
552 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XXI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
2. Positive and Negative Factors in Determining Award Percentage 
Rule 21F-6 sets out the factors the SEC may apply in making its 
award determinations—factors that are reviewed “in relation to the 
unique facts and circumstances of each case.”76 Four of these factors 
will favor increasing the amount of the award while three other factors 
favor decreasing the amount.77 The Commission emphasized that “the 
absence of any one of the positive factors does not mean that the award 
percentage will be lower than 30 percent, nor does the absence of 
negative factors mean the award percentage will be higher than 10 
percent.”78 In the event there are multiple qualifying whistleblowers, the 
Commission will employ these factors to “determine the relative 
allocation of awards among the whistleblowers.”79 
                                                                                                                 
In addition to redacting the whistleblower’s name and position in the subject company, 
the order also redacted, among other information, the name and date of the enforcement 
action, the nature of the violations committed by the defendant(s), and a summary of 
the information provided by the successful whistleblower. Id. This is to protect the 
confidentiality of whistleblowers, as required by the Dodd-Frank Act, by not disclosing 
any information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a 
whistleblower. As noted above, Section 21F(h)(2) of the Exchange Act requires that, 
except in certain limited specified circumstances, “the Commission and any officer or 
employee of the Commission shall not disclose any information, including information 
provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, which could reasonably be expected to 
reveal the identity of a whistleblower.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2). The Adopting Release 
explains that the Commission “will not reveal the identity of a whistleblower or 
disclose other information that could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a 
whistleblower, except under circumstances described in the statute and the rule.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57. 
 76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6 (2015). The Adopting Release emphasizes this point: 
Since every enforcement matter is unique, the analytical framework 
adopted by the Commission in the final rule provides general 
principles without mandating a particular result. Accordingly, no 
attempt has been made to list the factors in order of importance, 
weigh the relative importance of each factor, or suggest how much 
any factor should increase or decrease the award percentage. 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *56. 
 77. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. 
 78. Adopting Release supra note 17, at *56. 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6. The Adopting Release explains that the rule “provide[s] for 
greater awards for more timely and more useful information, and reduced awards for 
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a. Positive Factors 
The first three positive factors are set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act. 
The fourth positive factor, participation in internal compliance systems, 
is not expressly set out in the Dodd-Frank Act but was added pursuant to 
the authority granted to the SEC under the Dodd-Frank Act to consider 
“such additional relevant factors as the Commission may establish by 
rule or regulation.”80 The rule does not list the positive factors in order 
of importance.81 
                                                                                                                 
whistleblowers whose dilatory or uncooperative conduct may impair our enforcement 
efforts.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *102. 
 80. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV). In explaining its rationale for adding this 
positive factor, and other related factors discussed below, the Adopting Release stated: 
In response to concerns expressed by commenters that the proposed 
rules could incentivize whistleblowers to bypass corporate 
compliance programs, delay reporting violations, or otherwise 
interfere with internal compliance systems in order to enhance their 
future award, we have taken several steps to address this in the final 
rule. First, to reflect the important investor protection role that 
corporate compliance programs can serve and increase the incentive 
for whistleblowers to participate in these programs, the final rule 
includes a positive factor that requires the Commission to assess 
whether the whistleblower participated in his or her company’s 
internal compliance and reporting systems. Second, to minimize 
ongoing investor harm, maximize the deterrent impact of our 
enforcement cases, and to discourage delayed reporting by 
whistleblowers, the final rule includes a negative factor that requires 
the Commission to assess whether the whistleblower substantially 
and unreasonably delayed reporting the securities violations. Lastly, 
to penalize whistleblowers who attempt to undermine their 
employer’s internal compliance or reporting systems, the final rule 
includes a negative factor that requires the Commission to assess 
whether there is evidence provided to the Commission that the 
whistleblower intentionally interfered with his or her company’s 
internal compliance systems. Together, these provisions are designed 
to give whistleblowers appropriate incentives to report securities 
violations voluntarily to their corporate compliance programs and 
not to impair the effectiveness of these important programs. 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57. 
 81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a). 
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i. Significance of the Whistleblower’s Information 
The first positive factor identified by Rule 21F-6(a) provides that 
the Commission will “assess the significance of the information 
provided by the whistleblower to the success of the Commission action 
or related action.”82 The SEC may examine, among other things, 
“whether the reliability and completeness of the information . . . resulted 
in the conservation of Commission resources.”83 The SEC may also look 
at “[t]he degree to which the information provided by the whistleblower 
supported one or more successful claims” in the enforcement action.84 
While all of the positive factors relate in one way or another to 
encouraging whistleblowers to provide helpful information, this factor 
focuses on the importance and usefulness of the information to the SEC. 
ii. Assistance Provided by the Whistleblower 
The second positive factor identified by Rule 21F-6(a) examines 
the additional value provided by the whistleblower in assisting the staff 
in its investigation and enforcement action. The rule states that in 
considering this factor, the SEC may look at, among other things, the 
following criteria: 
 
 “Whether the whistleblower provided ongoing, extensive, 
and timely cooperation and assistance;”85 
 “timeliness of the whistleblower’s initial report to the [SEC 
or, if appropriate,] the internal compliance or reporting 
system of the business organizations;”86 
 “resources conserved [by the SEC] as a result of the 
whistleblower’s assistance;”87 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(1)(i). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(1)(ii). 
 85. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(i). An example of the sort of value-added ongoing, 
extensive, and timely cooperation and assistance contemplated by the Rule would be 
“helping to explain complex transactions, interpreting key evidence, or identifying new 
and productive lines of inquiry.” Id. 
 86. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(ii). 
 87. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(iii). 
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 whether the whistleblower “encouraged or authorized 
others to assist the staff of the Commission who might 
otherwise might not have participated in the 
investigation;”88 
 “efforts undertaken by the whistleblower to remediate the 
harm caused by the violations, including assisting the 
authorities” in recovering investor money lost as a result of 
the violations;89 and 
 “unique hardships suffered by the whistleblower as a result 
of . . . reporting and assisting in the enforcement action.”90 
 
While neither the rule nor the Adopting Release provide further 
guidance on what constitutes a “unique hardship,” this factor has been 
applied where an employer unlawfully retaliated against a whistleblower 
in violation of Section 21F(h) of the Exchange Act.91 The Commission’s 
Order noted that the Claims Review Staff considered the “substantial 
evidence that the whistleblower suffered unique hardships as a result of 
reporting, and also found the Commission’s law enforcement interest to 
be compelling given the Commission’s previous findings of unlawful 
retaliation against this whistleblower.”92 
iii. Law Enforcement Interest 
The third positive factor relates to the SEC’s “programmatic 
interest” in protecting investors and in deterring violations of the 
securities laws.93 This factor focuses on “[t]he degree to which an award 
enhances the Commission’s ability to enforce the federal securities laws 
and protect investors.”94 The rule provides several examples of 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(iv). 
 89. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(v). 
 90. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(2)(vi). 
 91. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 
74826, 2015 WL 1907622 (Apr. 28, 2015); see also In re Paradigm Capital Mgmt., 
Exchange Act Release No. 72393, 2014 WL 2704311, at *4-8 (June 16, 2014). 
 92. Order Determining Whistleblower Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 
74826, 2015 WL 1907622, at *1 (Apr. 28, 2015). 
 93. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(3). 
 94. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(i). 
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circumstances the SEC may take into account in considering its 
“programmatic interest,” including the type and amount of harm caused 
by the violation and the number of individuals harmed;95 whether the 
subject matter of the violation is an SEC priority, “the reported 
misconduct involves regulated entities or fiduciaries,” or “the 
whistleblower exposed an industry-wide practice” or a long-standing 
ongoing violation;96 and whether the announcement of an award 
payment “encourages the submission of high quality information from 
[other] whistleblowers.”97 
iv. Participation in Internal Compliance Systems 
The fourth and final positive factor looks at the extent to which the 
whistleblower participated in a company’s internal compliance 
systems.98 Unlike the three prior positive factors, this positive factor was 
not set forth in the Dodd-Frank Act. Rather, this factor was one of a 
number of rules that the SEC adopted in order to “incentivize 
whistleblowers to utilize their companies’ internal compliance and 
reporting systems when appropriate.”99 The Commission expressly 
stated in the Adopting Release that “in order to encourage 
whistleblowers to utilize internal reporting processes, we expect to give 
credit in the calculation of award amounts to whistleblowers who utilize 
established internal procedures for the receipt and consideration of 
complaints about misconduct.”100 As the Commission has recognized in 
this and other aspects of the whistleblower program, “effective internal 
compliance programs can in appropriate circumstances provide 
significant benefits both in terms of reducing the harm that entities and 
investors experience from securities law violations, and in terms of 
efficiently assisting our own enforcement efforts.”101 
                                                                                                                 
 95. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(iv). 
 96. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(iii). 
 97. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(3)(ii). 
 98. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4). 
 99. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *3. 
 100. Id. at *42 n.197. 
 101. Id. at *101. In discussing the benefits accruing to the Commission’s 
enforcement efforts from an effective internal compliance program, the Adopting 
Release noted: 
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While this positive factor incentivizes whistleblowers to report 
internally, “there are circumstances where a whistleblower may have 
legitimate reasons for not wanting to report the information internally, 
for example, legitimate concerns about misconduct by the company’s 
management or within the internal compliance program, or a reasonable 
basis to fear retaliation or personal harm”102 However, the Commission 
has recognized that each case is unique, and some factors may not be 
applicable or may deserve greater weight than others depending on the 
facts and circumstances. For this reason, the absence of any one of the 
                                                                                                                 
[I]nternal compliance procedures can complement or otherwise 
appreciably enhance our enforcement efforts in appropriate 
circumstances. For instance, the subject company may at times be 
better able to distinguish between meritorious and frivolous claims, 
and may make such findings available for the Commission. This 
would be particularly true in instances where the reported matter 
entails a high level of institutional or company-specific knowledge 
and/or the company has a well-functioning internal compliance 
program in place. Screening allegations through internal compliance 
programs may limit false and frivolous claims, provide the entity an 
opportunity to resolve the violation and report the result to the 
Commission, and allow the Commission to use its resources more 
efficiently. 
Id. at *104 n.450. 
 102. Id. at *48. While the scope of this article does not cover the anti-retaliation 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, we note that there is currently a split among the 
circuit courts as to whether these provisions protect a person who reports a securities 
law violation only to a company’s internal compliance and reporting systems, rather 
than to the Commission as well. Compare Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 
F.3d 620, 630 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the Dodd-Frank Act “clearly expresses 
Congress’s intention to require individuals to report information to the SEC” to receive 
the protections accorded to whistleblowers by the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions and 
“reject[ing] the SEC’s expansive interpretation of the term ‘whistleblower’ for purposes 
of the whistleblower-protection provision”), with Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, 801 
F.3d 145, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding the Dodd-Frank Act “sufficiently ambiguous” 
on the question of whether a person must report to the SEC to obtain the protection of 
the Act’s anti-retaliation protections and, therefore, “defer[ring] to the [SEC’s] 
reasonable interpretive rule” that accords this protection to persons who report 
wrongdoing to their employer, despite not having reported to the Commission). 
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positive factors, including participation in internal compliance systems, 
will not necessarily preclude a maximum award.103 
 In considering this factor, the SEC may take into account, among 
other things, whether the whistleblower reported internally “before, or at 
the same time as, reporting . . . to the Commission,”104 and whether, and 
the extent to which, the whistleblower “assisted any internal 
investigation or inquiry concerning the reported securities violations.”105 
b. Negative Factors 
The three negative factors mentioned in the Final Rules are, to 
some extent, the antithesis of the positive factors discussed above. For 
example, if instead of utilizing his employer’s internal compliance 
system to report a concern, a whistleblower interferes with his 
company’s internal compliance system, the SEC will assess this fact in 
determining an award calculation. Furthermore, if instead of cooperating 
and assisting the SEC in its investigation, a whistleblower unreasonably 
delayed reporting a violation to the SEC, this will also be treated as a 
negative factor in determining the whistleblower’s award percentage. 
i. Interference with Internal Compliance and Reporting Systems 
While reporting internally is a positive factor in the Commission’s 
award determination, if the whistleblower’s interaction with his or her 
company’s internal compliance system had the effect of “undermining 
the integrity” of the system, this will instead constitute a negative factor 
in the Commission’s analysis.106 The rule states that, in considering this 
factor, the Commission will take into account whether the whistleblower 
knowingly: (1) interfered with his entity’s established legal, compliance, 
or audit procedures “to prevent or delay detection of the reported 
                                                                                                                 
 103. See id. at *56 (“[a] whistleblower who provides the Commission with 
significant information about a possible securities violation and provides substantial 
assistance in the Commission action or related action could receive the maximum 
award regardless of whether the whistleblower satisfied other factors such as 
participating in internal compliance programs”). 
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(a)(4)(i). 
 105. Id. § 240.21F-6(a)(4)(ii). 
 106. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3). 
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securities violation”;107 (2) made “materially false, fictitious, or 
fraudulent statements or representations that hindered the entity’s efforts 
to detect, investigate, or remediate the reported securities violations”;108 
and (3) “provided any false writing or document knowing the writing or 
document contained any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or 
entries that hindered an [employer’s] efforts to detect, investigate, or 
remediate the reported securities violations.”109 
ii. Whistleblower’s Culpability 
If a whistleblower participated in the securities violation, this may 
count as a negative factor and cause an award to be reduced depending 
upon the extent of the whistleblower’s culpability or involvement in the 
violation.110 The rule lists a number of factors that the SEC may take 
into account in determining whether to consider the whistleblower’s 
participation as a negative factor in its award determination. These 
factors essentially cover two primary areas: (1) the extent of the 
whistleblower’s participation;111 and (2) the whistleblower’s background 
and knowledge.112 
                                                                                                                 
 107. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3)(i). 
 108. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3)(ii). 
 109. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(3)(iii). 
 110. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1). 
 111. The factors covered by this category include: 
 
 “The whistleblower’s role in the securities violations.” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(i); 
 “Whether the whistleblower acted with scienter . . . .” Id. § 240.21F-
6(b)(1)(iii); 
 “Whether the whistleblower financially benefitted from the violations.” Id. § 
240.21F-6(b)(1)(iv); 
 “The egregiousness of the underlying fraud committed by the whistleblower.” 
Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(vi); and 
 “Whether the whistleblower knowingly interfered with the Commission’s 
investigation of the violations . . . .” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(vii). 
 
 112. The factors covered by this category include: 
 
 “The whistleblower’s education, training, experience, and position of 
responsibility at the time the violations occurred.” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(ii); 
and 
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 In addition, although culpability does not per se bar an individual 
from receiving a whistleblower award (unless the individual is 
criminally convicted for his role in the violation),113 any monetary 
sanctions imposed on a culpable whistleblower or on an entity the 
liability of which is attributable largely to the whistleblower’s conduct 
will not count toward either the $1 million award threshold set out in 
Rule 21F-10 or the amount of sanctions collected for purposes of paying 
on an award.114 The purpose of this rule is to ensure that culpable 
whistleblowers do not benefit financially from their own misconduct or 
misconduct for which they are substantially responsible.115 
While a culpable whistleblower may still be eligible to receive a 
whistleblower award, this does not mean that the whistleblower cannot 
be charged in an enforcement action by the SEC for his misconduct.116 
iii. Unreasonable Reporting Delay 
A whistleblower who unreasonably delays reporting a violation to 
the SEC could face a reduction in the award percentage he or she 
                                                                                                                 
 “Whether the whistleblower is a recidivist.” Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(1)(v). 
 
 113. As noted above, otherwise eligible whistleblowers who were convicted of a 
criminal violation related to the enforcement action for which they are seeking an award 
will be barred from receiving an award. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(B) (2012). 
 114. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-16. The Commission explained in the Adopting Release 
why it rejected the suggestion of many commentators for barring culpable 
whistleblowers: 
[W]e do not believe that a per se exclusion for culpable 
whistleblowers is consistent with Section 21F of the Exchange Act. 
By allowing certain less-culpable whistleblowers to receive awards 
consistent with the limitations set forth in the final rules, we have 
provided incentives for persons involved in wrongdoing to come 
forward and disclose illegal conduct involving others while limiting 
awards to those whistleblowers. 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57. 
 115. Id. at *90. 
 116. See id. at *90 n.391 (noting that a culpable whistleblower may not only hurt his 
or her chances of receiving an award but that he or she can also be “prosecuted for his 
[or her] involvement in the misconduct”). 
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receives.117 In deciding whether a whistleblower’s delay in reporting 
was unreasonable, the SEC may take into account, among other things, 
the reasons for the delay, and whether the whistleblower was aware of 
the relevant facts but failed to take reasonable steps to report or prevent 
the violations from occurring or continuing, or only reported them after 
learning about a related inquiry, investigation, or enforcement action.118 
This rule is meant to incentivize whistleblowers to promptly report 
violations and to provide a disincentive for tardy reporting.119 
C. AWARD REVIEW PROCESS 
The whistleblower award process is a multistep review where an 
applicant informs the SEC why they are entitled to an award, the SEC 
then examines the application to determine if the claim should be 
granted, and, if so, the amount that should be paid to the successful 
claimant. We have previously discussed the requirements for qualifying 
for an award and the analysis undertaken by the SEC in deciding upon 
the award percentage for successful applicants. In this section, we will 
discuss how the SEC conducts its award review process and the rights 
available for claimants to contest the decisions made by the SEC. 
                                                                                                                 
 117. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-6(b)(2). 
 118. Id. § 240.21F-6(b)(2)(i)-(ii). 
 119. The Commission stated in the Adopting Release that the purpose of this 
negative factor is “to minimize ongoing investor harm, maximize the deterrent impact 
of our enforcement cases, and to discourage delayed reporting by whistleblowers.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *57. The Commission further explained that: 
Rule 21F-6 allows the Commission to set the award percentage 
based, among other things, on the significance of the information 
provided by the whistleblower and any unreasonable delay by the 
whistleblower in making the submission. Taken together, these rules 
provide for greater awards for more timely and more useful 
information, and reduced awards for whistleblowers whose dilatory 
or uncooperative conduct may impair our enforcement efforts. 
Id. at *102. 
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1. Posting a Notice of Covered Action 
As discussed above,120 whenever an SEC enforcement action results 
in monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million, the OWB will post 
a “Notice of Covered Action” (“NoCa”) on its website.121 Once the 
OWB publishes a NoCA, a whistleblower has 90 days from the date of 
publication to file a claim of award, or else the claim will be barred.122 
All claims must be submitted on Form WB-APP, which must be signed 
and submitted to the OWB by mail or fax.123 A claimant can no longer 
remain anonymous at this stage, and his or her identity must be 
disclosed on Form WB-APP.124 
To ensure that all potential whistleblowers who may have 
contributed to the success of the enforcement action are provided with 
the opportunity to submit a claim and to make their case for why they 
are entitled to an award, the SEC provides notice through the NoCA 
posting procedure.125 As the Commission recognized, the posting of a 
NoCA “provides the best mechanism to provide notice to all 
whistleblower claimants who may have contributed to the action’s 
success [and] . . . ensure that all potential claimants have a fair 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 121. See Claim an Award, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/owb-
awards.shtml [http://perma.cc/S26Y-L6RQ]. 
 122. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(a). The Commission reasoned: 
[T]his 90-day period strikes an appropriate balance between 
competing whistleblower interests—allowing all potential 
whistleblowers a reasonable opportunity to periodically review the 
Commission’s website and to file an application, on the one hand, 
but providing finality to the application period so that the 
Commission can begin the process of assessing any applications and 
making a timely award to any qualifying whistleblowers, on the 
other hand. 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *79. 
 123. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(b). The Form WB-APP can be found at 
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formtcr.pdf [http://perma.cc/99DA-Y5L8]. Claimants 
can also submit information through the Commission’s Tips, Complaints, and Referral 
System, which can be found at http://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExternal/index.xhtml 
[http://perma.cc/UY5F-YJAS]. 
 124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(c). 
 125. Id. 
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opportunity to pursue an award claim.”126 In addition, to the extent the 
Enforcement staff has worked closely with a particular whistleblower 
during the course of the investigation and enforcement action, the OWB 
will generally contact the whistleblower to ensure that the whistleblower 
is aware of the posting and the deadline for submitting an award 
application.127 
2. Claims Review: Staff Review and Preliminary Determination 
Beyond this initial intake and preliminary review, the SEC will not 
begin reviewing award applications until the time for filing any appeals 
of the underlying enforcement action has expired, or where an appeal 
has been filed, after all appeals in the action have been concluded.128 
The review is conducted by the Claims Review Staff, which is the staff 
designated by the Director of the Division of Enforcement to evaluate 
all timely whistleblower award claims submitted on Form WB-APP in 
accordance with the criteria set forth in the whistleblower rules.129 In 
connection with this process, the OWB may require whistleblowers to 
“provide additional information relating to their eligibility for an award 
or [to show] satisfaction of any of the conditions for an award.”130 
In making its decision, the Claims Review Staff may rely upon the 
whistleblower’s award application, sworn declarations from the staff 
that worked on the successful enforcement action, the relevant orders 
and pleadings, and other appropriate materials.131 The Claims Review 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Id. 
 127. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *79. 
 128. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d). 
 129. Id. In the Adopting Release, the Commission explained that the Director of 
Enforcement “may designate staff from the Enforcement Division, the Office of the 
Whistleblower, or other Commission divisions or offices to serve on the Claims Review 
Staff, either on a case-by-case basis or for fixed periods, as the Director deems 
appropriate.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *80. 
 130. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *77. 
 131. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-12(a). In addition to the applicant’s Form WB-APP, the 
staff’s views (in the form of a sworn declaration), and the orders and pleadings, the 
Claims Review Staff may also review: (i) transcripts of the enforcement proceedings, 
including any exhibits; (ii) any appellate decisions or orders; and (iii) any other 
documents or materials, including sworn declarations, from third-parties that are 
received by the OWB and can help the Claims Review Staff to resolve the claimant’s 
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Staff may review the whistleblower’s Form TCR including attachments 
and other related materials provided by the whistleblower to assist the 
Commission’s investigation. In listing these various documents that the 
Claims Review Staff and Commission may rely upon in making its 
determination, the Commission explained that “specifying the materials 
that we may rely upon will promote transparency and consistency in the 
claims review process.”132 
Following the evaluation of the claim, the Claims Review Staff will 
issue a Preliminary Determination recommending whether it should be 
allowed or denied, and, if allowed, the proposed award amount that 
should be granted.133 In its Preliminary Determination, the Claims 
Review Staff will explain the reasons for its decision.134 The OWB will 
then sends copies of the Preliminary Determination to the claimants,135 
along with a letter outlining the claimants’ rights under the 
whistleblower rules to request the record reviewed by the Claims 
Review Staff and to contest the Preliminary Determination. 
3. Contesting a Preliminary Determination 
If a whistleblower wishes to contest a Preliminary Determination, 
he needs to submit a written response to the OWB explaining the 
grounds for objecting to either the denial of an award or the proposed 
amount of an award.136 Before deciding to contest a Preliminary 
Determination, a whistleblower may request that the OWB provide for 
his review the materials that formed the basis of the Claims Review 
                                                                                                                 
award application, including information related to the claimant’s eligibility. 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.21F-12(a)(1)(iii), (v), (6). 
 132. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *83. 
 133. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(d). 
 134. See, e.g., SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary Determination of the Claims 
Review Staff, Notice of Covered Action 2011-194 (June 16, 2014), 
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/owb-2011-194-final-081514.pdf [http://pe 
rma.cc/7GA6-XH8F] (denying the claim because there was no evidence showing that 
the claimant had provided information to the Commission relating to the Covered 
Action or any other Commission matter). 
 135. Id. 
 136. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(e). 
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Staff’s Preliminary Determination.137 This request must be submitted to 
the OWB within 30 days of the date of the Preliminary Determination.138 
While a whistleblower has the right to review the materials that 
formed the basis of the Claims Review Staff’s Preliminary 
Determination, this right has certain limitations. First, the whistleblower 
is not entitled to obtain any materials beyond those that formed the basis 
of an award determination.139 Thus, a whistleblower does not have the 
right to review the investigative files or to interview the Enforcement 
staff. Second, a whistleblower is not entitled to review “pre-decisional 
or internal deliberative process materials that are prepared exclusively to 
assist the Commission in deciding the claim.”140 Finally, the OWB may 
make redactions as necessary “to comply with any statutory restrictions, 
to protect the Commission’s law enforcement and regulatory functions, 
and to comply with requests for confidential treatment from other law 
enforcement and regulatory authorities.”141 For example, in the case 
where the Claims Review Staff issues a Preliminary Determination for 
multiple whistleblowers applying for the same covered action, the OWB 
will usually redact identifying information about the other 
whistleblowers from the materials provided to each whistleblower so as 
not to “out” one claimant to the other co-award claimants.142 
In forwarding these materials to a whistleblower, the OWB may 
require the whistleblower to sign a confidentiality agreement before 
receiving the materials.143 The confidentiality agreement will cover all 
                                                                                                                 
 137. Id. § 240.21F-10(e)(1)(i). 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. § 240.21F-12(b). 
 140. Id.; see also Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *84 (pointing out that “[t]hese 
materials are by their nature pre-decisional work product that may often contain the 
staff’s frank discussion of legal and policy making materials, and the disclosure of these 
materials would have a chilling effect on our decision-making process” (internal 
quotation omitted)). 
 141. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-12(b); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *84. 
 142. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(2)(A) (2012) (providing that, with certain exceptions, 
“the Commission and any officer or employee of the Commission shall not disclose any 
information, including information provided by a whistleblower to the Commission, 
which could reasonably be expected to reveal the identity of a whistleblower”). 
 143. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-12(b). 
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non-public information provided to the whistleblower.144 It will also 
include a provision that a violation of the agreement may lead to the 
whistleblower’s ineligibility to receive an award.145 
During the same 30-day period that a whistleblower has to request 
the materials that formed the basis of the Preliminary Determination, the 
whistleblower can also request a meeting with the OWB to discuss the 
Preliminary Determination.146 The decision on whether to grant a 
request for a meeting is within the sole discretion of the OWB, and the 
OWB may choose to decline the request.147 If the OWB grants a request 
for a meeting, the OWB will listen to the whistleblower’s concerns and 
answer questions about the claims-review process.148 
If a whistleblower decides to contest a Preliminary Determination, 
he or she must submit his or her written response and supporting 
materials within the later of: (1) 60 days of the date of the Preliminary 
Determination; or (2) “if a request to review [the Claims Review Staff] 
materials is made,” then within 60 days of when the OWB provided the 
materials for the whistleblower’s review.149 If a Preliminary 
Determination recommends denying a whistleblower’s claim and the 
whistleblower chooses not to contest the Preliminary Determination, or 
fails to submit a timely response contesting the Preliminary 
Determination, then the Preliminary Determination will become the 
final order of the Commission, and the whistleblower will be deemed to 
                                                                                                                 
 144. “The addition of the reference to ‘non-public’ information that ‘the 
Commission provides’ clarifies that the rule does not limit the whistleblower’s use of 
information that he or she already knows, or learns from other sources, and does not 
acquire through our investigation.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *62. 
 145. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(b)(4). 
 146. Id. § 240.21F-10(e)(1)(ii). 
 147. Id. 
 148. The Adopting Release does suggest that the OWB could use these meetings “in 
appropriate cases as an opportunity to reach a tentative agreement with a meritorious 
whistleblower on the terms of a Proposed Final Determination, which could then be 
presented to the Commission for approval.” Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *79 
n.350. In such a case, the Claims Review Staff would have determined that the 
whistleblower should receive an award and the only issue would be the amount of the 
award. 
 149. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(e)(2). 
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have failed to exhaust his or her administrative remedies and will be 
prohibited from appealing the denial to the courts.150 
A whistleblower can also contest a Preliminary Determination in 
which the Claims Review Staff recommended the granting of an award 
if the whistleblower wishes to dispute the amount of the award 
recommendation. In such instance, the whistleblower will need to 
comply with the same deadlines applicable to whistleblowers receiving 
a denial recommendation.151 However, if a whistleblower fails to timely 
protest a Preliminary Determination recommending the granting an 
award, this will not convert the Preliminary Determination into a Final 
Order of the Commission, but rather will convert it to a Proposed Final 
Determination for the Commission’s final consideration152 because, 
under the whistleblower rules, the Commission has the ultimate 
authority to authorize award payments.153 
If a whistleblower submits a timely response contesting a 
Preliminary Determination, then the Claims Review Staff will 
reconsider the whistleblower’s claim and issue a Proposed Final 
Determination. In reviewing the whistleblower’s request for 
reconsideration, the Claims Review Staff will examine “the issues and 
grounds” raised by the whistleblower, “along with any supporting 
documentation” provided.154 
When the Claims Review Staff issues a Proposed Final 
Determination, either in response to a timely request for reconsideration 
or as a result of a recommendation to pay an award, the OWB will 
notify the Commission of the Proposed Final Determination.155 Within 
30 days of receiving this notice, any Commissioner can, if he or she 
chooses, request that the full Commission review the Proposed Final 
                                                                                                                 
 150. Id. § 240.21F-10(f). As the Adopting Release explains, “a claimant’s failure to 
submit a timely response to a Preliminary Determination where the determination was 
to deny an award would constitute a failure to exhaust the claimant’s administrative 
remedies, and the claimant would be prohibited from pursuing a judicial appeal.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *78. 
 151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(f); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *78. 
 152. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(f); Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *78. 
 153. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-10(h). 
 154. Id. § 240.21F-10(g). 
 155. Id. § 240.21F-10(h). 
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Determination.156 If no Commissioner requests a review within the 30-
day period, then the Proposed Final Determination will become the 
Final Order of the Commission. “In the event a Commissioner requests a 
review, the Commission will review the record that the [Claims Review 
Staff] relied upon in making its determinations . . . and issue its Final 
Order.”157 Once the Commission issues its Final Order, the OWB will 
promptly forward it to the whistleblower(s).158 
4. Appealing the SEC’s Final Order 
The Dodd-Frank Act provides that the SEC’s Final Orders on 
whistleblower award applications “shall be in the discretion of the 
Commission.”159 This discretion includes decisions on “whether, to 
whom, or in what amount to make awards.”160 With regard to the 
amount awarded, the Dodd-Frank Act specifically states that “[t]he 
determination of the amount of an award . . . shall be in the discretion of 
the Commission.”161 Indeed, the statute goes further and provides that 
the determination of the amount of an award is not appealable “if the 
award was made in accordance with subsection (b).”162 However, the 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. § 240.21F-10(i). As noted, the whistleblower rules direct the OWB to send 
claimants the Preliminary Determination and the Final Order. See id. § 240.21F-10(d), 
(i). There is no requirement for OWB to send claimants the Proposed Final 
Determination. Thus, there is no provision in the rules for a claimant to contest a 
Proposed Final Determination (aside from a Preliminary Determination recommending 
an award, which, as discussed above, will be deemed a Proposed Final Determination 
for purposes of Rule 21F-10(h)). 
 159. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A) (2012). 
 160. Id. § 78u-6(f). 
 161. Id. § 78u-6(c)(1)(A). 
 162. Id. § 78u-6(f). As discussed above, Section 21F(b)(1) directs that if the SEC 
determines to pay a whistleblower award, the award must be at least 10%, and not more 
than 30%, of the “monetary sanctions” that have been collected in the enforcement 
action. See supra notes 11, 71 and accompanying text. The whistleblower rules clarify 
that not only are award determinations not appealable if they fall within the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s 10% to 30% parameters, but so too are “any factual findings, legal conclusions, 
policy judgments, or discretionary assessments involving the Commission’s 
consideration of the factors in [Rule] 21F-6.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(a). This is further 
clarified in the Adopting Release where the Commission stated, “when the Commission 
makes an award between 10 and 30 percent, and that determination is based on the 
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denial of an award “may be appealed to the appropriate court of appeals 
of the United States not more than 30 days after the determination is 
issued by the Commission.”163 Under Section 25(a)(1) of the Exchange 
Act and Rule 21F-13(a), appeals of final orders of the Commission can 
be made to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, or to the circuit where the aggrieved person resides or 
has his or her principal place of business.164 
Under the Final Rules, “the record on appeal shall consist of the 
Preliminary Determination, the Final Order of the Commission, and any 
other items from those set forth in [Rule] 21F-12(a) . . . that either the 
claimant or the Commission identifies for inclusion in the record.”165 
However, “the record on appeal shall not include any pre-decisional or 
internal deliberative process materials that are prepared exclusively to 
assist the Commission in deciding the claim, (including the staff’s Draft 
Final Determination in the event that the Commissioners reviewed the 
claim and issued the Final Order).”166  
II. CONSIDERATIONS FOR PROSPECTIVE AWARD APPLICANTS 
A. INFORMATION SUBMITTED PRE-DODD-FRANK DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR 
AN AWARD: STRYKER V. SEC 
As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act defined “original 
information” as information that is: (1) “derived from the 
[whistleblower’s] independent knowledge or [independent] analysis;” 
(2) not already known to the Commission; and (3) not derived from a 
previous judicial, administrative, or government proceeding.167 The 
                                                                                                                 
factors set forth in Rule 21F-6, our final order regarding the amount of an award 
(including the award allocation among multiple whistleblowers) is not appealable.” 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *84. 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(f). 
 164. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 25(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(a)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 
240.21F-13(a). 
 165. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-13(b). 
 166. Id. The exclusion of pre-decisional and internal deliberative process materials 
from the record on appeal mirrors the prohibition in Rule 21F-12(b) against a 
whistleblower who wishes to review or receive those materials in advance of making a 
decision on contesting a Preliminary Determination. 
 167. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(3) 
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Final Rules also made clear that the information must be provided after 
July 21, 2010, the date of the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment.168 
As noted in the Adopting Release, the July 21 cut-off reflects the 
fact that: 
Congress enacted Section 21F in order to provide new incentives for 
individuals with knowledge of securities violations to report those 
violations to the Commission. [The SEC] believe[d] that applying 
Section 21F prospectively—for new information provided to the 
Commission after the statute’s enactment and not to information 
previously submitted—is most consistent with Congressional intent 
and with the language of the statute.169 
In support of this interpretation, the Commission noted that Section 
924(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act expressly states that a whistleblower’s 
written information will not lose the status of original information even 
if it is submitted prior to the effective date of the Final Rules, i.e., 
August 12, 2011, so long as it “is provided by the whistleblower after 
the effective date of this subtitle,” i.e., July 21, 2010.170 
The Commission’s decision to deny an award application because 
the whistleblower’s information had been submitted before the 
enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act was recently upheld by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In Stryker v. SEC, the 
whistleblower did not dispute that he had provided information to the 
Commission prior to July 2010.171 He contended, however, that the 
provision of Rule 21F-4(b) requiring that “original information” must 
have been submitted after that date was “contrary to the statute” because 
this requirement is not part of the statutory definition of “original 
information.”172 
The Second Circuit rejected this contention outright. The court 
noted that the two-step analysis for determining whether an agency’s 
rule is a permissible interpretation of the authorizing statute was set out 
in the Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *18-19. 
 169. Id. at *19 (emphasis added). 
 170. Id. at *19 n.94 (quoting Dodd-Frank Act § 924(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-7(b)) 
(emphasis added). 
 171. Stryker v. SEC, 780 F.3d 163, 165 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 172. Id. at 165. 
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Resources Defense Council, Inc.173 In describing the familiar analysis 
prescribed by Chevron, the Second Circuit stated that the first step is to 
see, by reviewing the statute and, if need be, the legislative history, 
whether “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at 
issue.”174 If it has, “the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”175 If, however, the 
court cannot conclude that Congress has directly spoken on the matter, 
then, under the Chevron analysis, the court is instructed to “defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers, so long as it is 
reasonable.”176 
In applying the first step of the Chevron analysis, the Second 
Circuit noted that, while Section 21F(a)(3) is silent as to whether 
information submitted prior to the Dodd-Frank Act’s enactment 
qualifies as “original information,”177 other provisions in Section 21F are 
clear that “a putative whistleblower must provide the requisite 
information in the form and manner required by SEC’s rules and 
regulations” and that “‘original information’ had to be submitted in 
conformity with the SEC’s rules and regulations.”178 The Second Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
 173. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 174. Stryker, 780 F.3d at 165 (quoting New York ex rel. N.Y. State Office of 
Children & Family Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. Admin. for Children 
& Families, 556 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. at 166 (characterizing Section 21F(a)(3) as “leav[ing] a number of loose 
ends”). 
 178. Id. (citing to the statutory definition of whistleblower found in Section 
21F(a)(6), and the general statutory authorization in Section 21F(j) granting the 
Commission “the authority to issue such rules and regulations as may be necessary or 
appropriate to implement the provisions of this section consistent with the purposes of 
this section”). The court also noted the statutory prohibition against awarding 
whistleblowers who “fail[] to submit information to the Commission in such form as 
the Commission may, by rule, require.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(c)(2)(D). 
  Recognizing that “[s]uch rules and regulations [were] of necessity promulgated 
sometime after [the statute] was passed,” the court pointed out that Congress created an 
express safe-harbor for information that was submitted after the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
enactment but before the effective date of the Final Rules, provided that the information 
was submitted in writing. Stryker, 780 F.3d at 166 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u–7(b)). Rule 
21F-9(d) gave effect to this safe-harbor by providing that original information 
submitted in writing after July 21, 2010, but before the effective date of these rules will 
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further stated that “if the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act was to 
encourage whistleblower activity, already completed actions would 
arguably not qualify.”179 While all of this would appear to show a 
congressional intent to limit awards only to whistleblowers who 
submitted original information after the enactment of the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the Second Circuit did not need to reach a definitive finding that 
Congress clearly intended this result during the first part of the Chevron 
analysis. Even if the Dodd-Frank Act was ambiguous on this point, the 
Second Circuit ruled that the Commission’s decision to impose a July 
21, 2010 cut-off date was a reasonable interpretation of the Dodd-Frank 
Act’s whistleblower provisions and thus was entitled to deference under 
the second part of the Chevron analysis.180 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court emphasized that Congress clearly “delegated to the SEC 
rulemaking authority to implement the whistleblower award program 
and specific authority to determine the ‘form and manner’ in which 
information had to be submitted in order to qualify as ‘original 
information.’”181 
Stryker’s holding is clear: under the Final Rules, only information 
submitted after the July 21, 2010 cut-off will be considered original 
information. Therefore, whistleblowers that have submitted information 
around the period of the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act should ensure 
that their information was submitted after the cut-off. Otherwise, the 
OWB will refuse to consider the information as basis to make an award. 
B. NEXUS REQUIRED BETWEEN TIP AND COVERED ACTION 
The Final Rules require that, in order to be eligible for an award, a 
whistleblower’s tip must have led to the success of the enforcement 
                                                                                                                 
be deemed to satisfy the requirements for submitting original information under the 
Final Rules. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 167. 
 181. Id. at 166. As further support that Rule 21F-4(b)(b)(iv) is consistent with 
Congress’s intent, the court pointed to the safe-harbor provision of 15 U.S.C. § 78u–
7(b), discussed in supra note 170, which provides a limited exception from the 
requirement that “original information” must be submitted pursuant to the SEC’s rules 
for information submitted after enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act and prior to the 
effective date of the Final Rules. This limited exclusion, the court stated,” supports an 
inference that Rule 21F–4(b)(1)(iv) is consistent with legislative intent.” Id. 
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action for which he or she seeks an award.182 This means that the 
whistleblower’s information must be “sufficiently specific, credible, and 
timely” to have caused the Commission to open an investigation and 
bring an action based in whole or in part on the conduct the 
whistleblower described, or must have otherwise significantly 
contributed to the success of the action.183 As the Commission stated in 
the Adopting Release: 
[I]n assessing whether information ‘led to’ a successful enforcement 
action, we will examine the relationship between the information in 
a submission and the allegations in the Commission’s complaint 
filed in the civil action or order filed in the administrative 
proceeding. Our inquiry will focus on whether the submission 
identifies persons, entities, places, times and/or conduct that 
correspond to those alleged by the Commission in the judicial or 
administrative action. . . . In applying [the significantly contributed] 
standard, among other things we will look at factors such as whether 
the information allowed us to bring: (1) our successful action in 
significantly less time or with significantly fewer resources, 
additional successful claims; (2) additional successful claims; or (3) 
successful claims against additional individuals or entities.184 
In deciding whether to submit an award application, whistleblowers 
should carefully read the description of the Covered Actions posted on 
the OWB’s website and examine the extent to which their information is 
related to the subject matter of the covered action.185 Whistleblowers are 
also encouraged to review the public pleadings in a judicial covered 
action, particularly the complaint, injunctive orders, and final 
judgment(s).186  
                                                                                                                 
 182. See supra Part I.A.3. 
 183. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(c)(1) (2015). 
 184. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *45-46. 
 185. See Claim an Award, supra note 121. 
 186. See Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), 
http://www.pacer.gov/ (offering case and docket information from federal appellate, 
district, and bankruptcy courts). The whistleblower can also find the pleadings at other 
websites. See, e.g., LexisNexis CourtLink, http://courtlink.lexisnexis.com; Westlaw 
CourtExpress, http://courtexpress.westlaw.com/; Justia Dockets & Filings, http://docket 
s.justia.com/. The Adopting Release advised that, as part of its analysis, the 
Commission 
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Repeated failure to establish this nexus can result in sanctions 
against a claimant. In one extreme example, the OWB determined that a 
claimant had failed to establish a factual nexus between the claimant’s 
tips and 143 separate covered actions for which the claimant had 
submitted award applications.187 In the Final Order, the OWB noted that 
                                                                                                                 
may consider whether, and the extent to which, the information 
included: (1) Allegations that formed the basis for any of the 
Commission’s claims in the judicial or administrative action; (2) 
provisions of the securities laws that the Commission alleged as 
having been violated in the judicial or administrative action; (3) 
culpable persons or entities (as well as offices, divisions, subsidiaries 
or other subparts of entities) that the Commission named as 
defendants, respondents or uncharged wrongdoers in the judicial or 
administrative action; or (4) investors or a defined group of investors 
that the Commission named as victims or injured parties in the 
judicial or administrative action. 
Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *45. 
 187. See SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary Determination of the Claims 
Review Staff 2 (May 12, 2014) [hereinafter SEC Claims Review Staff Order on May 
12, 2014], http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/owb-multiple-final-051214.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/U2VB-JDDW] (noting that the claimant had, in fact, submitted award 
applications for 196 covered actions, of which 143 were specifically reviewed in the 
Final Order); see also SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary Determination of the 
Claims Review Staff (Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/orders/ow 
b-final-031913.pdf [http://perma.cc/5L45-5EYX] (noting that of the fifty-three 
applications reviewed in the Final Order, the Commission had previously denied fifty-
one of these in March 2013 finding that the claimant’s tip did not lead to the successful 
enforcement of any of the covered actions); SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary 
Determination of the Claims Review Staff (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.sec.gov/rules/oth 
er/2015/owb-order-final-080515-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/A8K6-7PT3] (determining that 
a claimant who failed to object had similarly failed to establish a factual nexus between 
the claimant’s tips and twenty-five separate covered actions for which the claimant had 
submitted award applications). The Final Order of August 5, 2015 found that certain 
statements made in the claimant’s Form TCRs, emails to Commission officials, and 
applications for awards were “patently false or fictitious” and that “Claimant’s 
submission of whistleblower award applications on Form WB-APP in which Claimant 
declares that Claimant is entitled to an award are patently false given that the WB-APPs 
Claimant has filed to date lack even a remote factual nexus to the covered actions for 
which Claimant is seeking an award.” SEC Claims Review Staff, Preliminary 
Determination of the Claims Review Staff, at 1 (Aug. 5, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2015/owb-order-final-080515-2.pdf [http://perma.cc/A8 
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the vast majority of the claimant’s award applications “lack[ed] even a 
superficial factual nexus to the covered actions for which [the 
whistleblower was] seeking an award.”188 The Final Order found that the 
whistleblower had repeatedly submitted “vague, unsupported, and 
utterly incredible” information in the whistleblower’s Form TCRs, Form 
WB-APPs, and other various communications with the OWB, and that 
the whistleblower’s continued submission of Form WB-APPs lacked 
“any factual nexus to the covered actions.”189 The Final Order further 
stressed that the whistleblower had “persistent[ly] refus[ed] to withdraw 
numerous unsupported claims or to change . . . behavior in spite of 
repeated requests” by the OWB.190 Accordingly, the Final Order 
determined that not only were the claimant’s 143 award applications to 
be denied, but also, invoking the Commission’s authority under 
Exchange Act Rule 21F-8(c)(7),191 declared that the claimant would no 
longer be eligible to be considered for a whistleblower award “in any 
future covered or related actions,” and the OWB was directed to 
                                                                                                                 
K6-7PT3]. The Final Order also determined that “Claimant’s knowing and willful state 
of mind in making these statements is evidenced by the following: (i) the vague, 
unsupported, and utterly incredible nature of Claimant’s statements in Appendix B [of 
the Final Order]; (ii) Claimant’s submission of the WB-APPs that lack any factual 
nexus to the covered actions; and (iii) Claimant’s refusal to withdraw numerous 
unsupported claims in spite of repeated requests and explanations by the Office of the 
Whistleblower.” Id. at 1-2. 
 188. SEC Claims Review Staff Order on May 12, 2014, supra note 187, at 2 
(including a six-page Appendix B that contained a list of numerous “vague, 
unsupported, and utterly incredible” statements made by the claimant in the claimant’s 
TCRs, emails to Commission officials, and Form WB-APP submissions). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. (detailing the numerous attempts the OWB made to explain to claimant the 
basic premise of the whistleblower award program and the necessity for their being a 
factual nexus between a whistleblower’s tip and covered action for which the 
whistleblower requests an award. The Final Order noted that the OWB had repeatedly 
warned the claimant that repeatedly filing claims for whistleblower awards that have no 
relation to the facts in the underlying matter will not result in an award under the 
whistleblower program). 
 191. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-8(c)(7) (2015) (providing that a whistleblower is not 
eligible to be considered for an award if the whistleblower “knowingly and willfully 
make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, or use any false 
writing or document knowing that it contains any false, fictitious, or fraudulent 
statement or entry with intent to mislead or otherwise hinder the Commission”). 
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“summarily reject all pending and future whistleblower award claims” 
submitted by the whistleblower.192 The Final Order explained that the 
whistleblower’s “unceasing submission of baseless claims has harmed 
the rights of legitimate whistleblowers and hindered the Commission’s 
implementation of the whistleblower program by, among other things, 
delaying the Commission’s ability to finalize meritorious awards to 
other claimants and consuming significant staff resources.”193 
As the Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement recognized 
when the Commission adopted the Final Rules, “the whistleblower 
program is designed to incentivize insiders and others who possess 
useful information regarding unlawful conduct to come forward early 
and assist the SEC with identifying and bringing enforcement actions 
against companies and individuals that have violated the securities 
laws.”194 This case illustrates the importance for the whistleblower of 
taking the time to ensure that there is a factual connection between the 
information furnished to the Commission and the subject matter of the 
covered action before deciding whether to apply for a whistleblower 
award. 
C. AWARD ISSUES IN CONNECTION WITH TIPS SUBMITTED TO OTHER 
AGENCIES OR SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATIONS OR AT SEC’S PRIOR 
REQUEST 
Not infrequently, a whistleblower decides to submit a tip to both 
the SEC and one or more other agencies or self-regulatory organizations 
such as FINRA. Indeed, the whistleblower rules incentivize 
whistleblowers to provide information to other agencies or self-
regulatory organizations by authorizing the SEC to pay additional 
awards for assistance provided in related actions of certain other 
                                                                                                                 
 192. SEC Claims Review Staff Order on May 12, 2014, supra note 187, at 3. 
 193. Id. at 2-3. 
 194. Robert S. Khuzami, Dir. of Enf’t, SEC, Remarks at Open Meeting – 
Whistleblower Program (May 25, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch05 
2511rk.htm [http://perma.cc/FG6E-H2CK]; see also Order Determining Whistleblower 
Award Claim, Exchange Act Release No. 72947, 2014 WL 4258232, 109 S.E.C. 
Docket 3790, at *3 (Aug. 29, 2014) (denying an award claim where, in part, the 
Commission was unable to discern “how [the claimant’s] information could have led to 
the successful enforcement of the Covered Action given the absence of any relevant 
factual connections between the two”). 
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agencies.195 However, despite this incentive for multiple-agency 
reporting, the rules contain some potential pitfalls for whistleblowers 
that wish to be rewarded for such conduct. In this section, we will 
highlight some of these pitfalls and discuss the options open to 
whistleblowers in such instances. 
As discussed above, the Commission is authorized to pay an award 
to a whistleblower who voluntarily provides the agency with original 
information that leads to its bringing a successful enforcement action in 
which it obtains monetary sanctions totaling more than $1 million.196 
When information is provided to the SEC after the SEC requested the 
information or after it was provided to another agency, the question may 
arise as to whether it was provided “voluntarily” to the SEC. Rule 21F-
4(a)(1) states that information will be deemed to have been provided 
“voluntarily” to the SEC if it was provided: 
before a request, inquiry, or demand that relates to the subject matter 
of your submission is directed to you or anyone representing you 
(such as an attorney): (i) By the Commission; (ii) In connection with 
an investigation, inspection, or examination by the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board, or any self-regulatory organization; or 
(iii) In connection with an investigation by the Congress, any other 
authority of the federal government, or a state Attorney General or 
securities regulatory authority.197 
Rule 21F-4(a)(2) clarifies that, in determining whether a “request, 
inquiry, or demand” was received, it does not matter whether the 
whistleblower was compelled to provide the information by a subpoena 
or other applicable law. Thus a simple informal request will suffice.198 In 
the Adopting Release, the Commission explained that the reason for this 
was “to create a strong incentive for whistleblowers to come forward 
                                                                                                                 
 195. See supra Part II.B. Section 21F(a)(5) requires that a related action must be 
“based upon the original information . . . that led to the successful enforcement of the 
Commission action.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(a)(5) (2012). As the Adopting Release makes 
clear, this means that a whistleblower cannot recover in a related action absent a 
successful Commission action. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *10. 
 196. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text. 
 197. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(1) (2015). 
 198. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *11-12. 
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early with information about possible violations of the federal securities 
laws, rather than wait to be approached by investigators.”199 
With one exception, any prior request from the SEC will cause a 
whistleblower’s information submission to be deemed not voluntary. 
The one exception applies if the whistleblower “voluntarily provided the 
same information to one of the other authorities identified above [i.e., 
the PCAOB, other self-regulatory organizations, Congress, other federal 
agencies, state Attorneys General or securities regulatory authorities] 
prior to receiving a request, inquiry, or demand from the 
Commission.”200 In the Adopting Release, the Commission explained 
that this exception: 
is intended to respond to comments that, as proposed, our rule could 
have had the unintended consequence of precluding a submission 
from being considered as ‘voluntary’ in circumstances where the 
whistleblower provided the information to another authority, the 
other authority referred the matter to the Commission, and our staff 
contacted the whistleblower before he or she had the opportunity to 
file a whistleblower submission with us.201 
With regard to all other SEC prior requests, the Adopting Release 
explained that the Commission decided to count all of these as not 
voluntary, regardless of whether the request was made in connection 
with an investigation, inspection or examination, because it “believe[d] 
that a whistleblower award should not be available to an individual who 
makes a submission after first being questioned about a matter (or 
otherwise requested to provide information) by the Commission staff 
acting pursuant to any of our investigative or regulatory authorities.”202 
Thus, for example, even a request for information from a non-
enforcement division at the SEC will prevent the whistleblower’s 
                                                                                                                 
 199. Id. at *11. 
 200. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(2). 
 201. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *16 n.81. It should be noted that the 
example provided in the Adopting Release covers a situation where “the other authority 
referred the matter to the Commission.” Id. (emphasis added). The Adopting Release 
did not discuss the situation where a whistleblower provides information to another 
agency in response to a routine regulatory inquiry and then, without any contact from 
the other agency, the SEC staff reaches out to the person for the same information in 
connection with its own inquiry. 
 202. Id. at *14. 
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subsequent submission from being deemed voluntary, provided, of 
course, that the request “relates to the subject matter of [the 
whistleblower’s] submission.”203 
The rule makes an important distinction between requests from the 
SEC and requests from other agencies/entities. While prior requests 
from the SEC, with the one exception noted above, will cause a 
whistleblower’s information submission to be deemed not voluntary, 
when it comes to prior requests from other agencies/entities, prior 
requests of certain types will cause the whistleblower’s submission to be 
deemed not voluntary. As the Commission explained in its Adopting 
Release: 
Only an investigative request made by one of the other designated 
authorities will trigger application of the rule, except that a request 
made in connection with an examination or inspection, as well as an 
investigative request, by staff of the PCAOB or a self-regulatory 
organization will also render a whistleblower’s subsequent 
submission relating to the same subject matter not “voluntary.” This 
provision recognizes the important relationship that frequently exists 
between examinations and enforcement investigations, as well as our 
regulatory oversight of the PCAOB and self-regulatory 
organizations.204 
Thus, in certain circumstances information is considered as 
provided voluntarily even though it was submitted in response to an 
SEC request, as when the whistleblower first voluntarily reported to 
another agency and that agency referred the matter to the Commission. 
On the other hand, information that was submitted to the SEC without a 
prior Commission request may be considered voluntarily. An example 
would be when another federal agency had requested the same 
information in connection with that agency’s investigation before the 
whistleblower submitted it to the SEC.205 
                                                                                                                 
 203. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-4(a)(1). 
 204. Adopting Release, supra note 17, at *14. 
 205. A claimant who cannot satisfy the “voluntary” requirement will not be able to 
obtain relief through the extraordinary circumstances exception found in Rule 21F-8(a). 
The extraordinary circumstances exception only applies to failures to comply with the 
procedural requirements “for submitting information and making a claim for an award” 
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CONCLUSION 
With this Article, it is our goal to provide an overview of the SEC’s 
whistleblower award program to help future claimants and their counsel 
better understand the award eligibility requirements and the criteria for 
determining the amount of any award paid by the Commission. With 
this goal in mind, we wish to emphasize a few key points. First, 
whistleblowers should make all possible efforts to understand and 
comply with the procedural requirements, including the deadlines for 
submitting a claim, so as not to be deemed ineligible for award 
consideration. For example, as upheld by Stryker, a claimant cannot be 
considered for an award if he or she only provided information to the 
SEC prior to the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act. Furthermore, 
whistleblowers who seek an award should review any NoCa posted to 
the SEC website and their corresponding judicial proceedings to ensure 
that there is a sufficient nexus between their tip and the success of the 
action. Finally, while whistleblowers are incentivized to report evidence 
of wrongdoing to other regulatory authorities as well as, if appropriate, 
the internal compliance personnel at their company, they should be 
cognizant of the rules relating to the voluntariness of tips provided to the 
SEC so that they do not inadvertently run afoul of this requirement and 
thereby be deemed ineligible for award consideration. It is our hope that 
this Article will provide rightful claimants with helpful guidance as they 
prepare their whistleblower award applications so as to maximize their 
chance of receiving a favorable award determination and further 
encourage potential whistleblowers to come forward with the vital 
information that is crucial to the success of SEC enforcement actions 
and the Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower program. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
specified in Rules 21F-9 through 21F-11, and does not apply to substantive 
requirements such as those found in Rule 21F-4. 
 
